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Abstract
Where product innovation requires several complementary patents,
fragmented property rights can be a factor that limits firms’ will-
ingness to invest in the development and commercialization of new
products. This paper studies multiple simultaneous R&D contests
for complementary patents and how they interact with patent port-
folios that firms may have acquired already. We also consider how
this interaction and the intensity of the contests depends on the type
of patent trade regimes and the product market equilibria that result
from these regimes. We solve for the contest equilibria and show that
the multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem
that considerably reduces the overall contest effort.
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1 Introduction
Many modern goods are produced using multiple, complementary technol-
ogy components, which are often protected under a number of patents. This
complementarity in production and in intellectual property generates several
challenges. Heller and Eisenberg (1998), for instance, discuss that such frag-
mented property rights defined around gene fragments in biotechnology may
reduce firms’ incentives to invest and commercialize products:
Foreseeable commercial products, such as therapeutic proteins
or genetic diagnostic tests, are more likely to require the use of
multiple fragments. A proliferation of patents on individual frag-
ments held by different owners seems inevitably to require costly
future transactions to bundle licenses together before a firm can
have an effective right to develop these products. (Heller and
Eisenberg 1998, p.699.)
Other problems with fragmented property rights have been discussed.
Firms that invest in a new product face the risk that, after sinking consid-
erable resources in this, another firm may essentially blackmail this firm by
claiming that this new product infringes on some patent held by this firm.
Ziedonis (2004, p.806) reports the case of Intel in 1998: "After developing
the architecture and tailoring its fabrication facilities to produce the new
chip, Intel was sued by a small communications company, S3, for allegedly
infringing patents S3 had purchased from a failed start-up company."
These examples illustrate that fragmentation of intellectual property rights
is a widespread phenomenon and involves important strategic issues both for
firms and policy makers. Ziedonis (2004) discusses whether firms may choose
to acquire large sets of patents as ’bargaining chips’ to deal with this problem.
Lerner and Tirole (2004) discuss the welfare properties of patent pools. They
briefly discuss the implications of patent pools for innovation, but mostly
concentrate on a situation with a given set of patents. Shapiro (2001) also
acknowledges the problems that emerge if complementary patents are allo-
cated between several firms. He discusses different arrangements of trading
to circumvent hold-up problems and problems that are similar in type as the
problem of double marginalization in the context of a downstream monopoly
that purchases an input from an upstream monopoly and is restricted to lin-
ear pricing and discusses several institutional arrangements by which firms
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essentially trade their patent rights. He also acknowledges the existence of
dynamic efficiency problems of the different trading arrangements in terms
of their implications for the incentives on R&D. However, similar to Lerner
and Tirole (2004), he focusses on static allocation efficiency aspects, i.e., on
the problem of inefficient use of an existing set of patents.
The dynamic aspect of the role of market structure for R&D has received
much attention in the literature as well, starting with Arrow (1962). In this
context much of the focus is on single patents that may be attained in an R&D
contest that may have one or multiple stages. The interaction of multiple
patents and their complementarity has received less attention. Some work in
this context focuses on a sequential structure of innovation, the incentives to
expend R&D effort in a first or in a second stage of a cumulative innovation,
and its policy implications for the allocation rules for the trading of patents
(e.g., Scotchmer 1996, Green and Scotchmer 1995, Denicolo 2002).
We focus on the innovation incentives in a situation similar to the one dis-
cussed by Heller and Eisenberg (1998): firms can make simultaneous invest-
ments in patents for several technology components, all of which are needed
to innovate and produce a new consumer product. We consider symmetric
firms who start this process without having acquired a stock of patents, and
the competition between firms in which some firm acquired some patents
already, but who competes with another firm about a set of further patents.
Dynamic commitment issues which emerge in sequential R&D, or uncer-
tainty about a possible infringement when commercializing a new product,
are absent from this consideration. We assume that the R&D processes for
the different technology components are random and independent of each
other. For this reason it will often be the case that one firm wins some
patents and a competitor wins the complementary set of patents. In this
case, none of the firms can produce without further arrangements or a real-
location of the rights to use the information that is protected by the patents.
The competition between two firms, A and B, that takes place for n com-
plementary patents has essentially three outcomes: A owns all patents and
receives all rent, B owns all patents and receives all rent, or both firms own
some patents and share the rent. In the first two cases the firm that owns
all patents will typically produce and earn a monopoly profit. However, the
outcome in the third case depends on the rules and arrangements according
to which patent rights can be traded between firms.
We analyse a benchmark case in which firms can freely trade exclusive
rights to use single patents and three other, more restricted regimes that
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can be related to the different types of transactions among patent holders
that are discussed in Shapiro (2001). We concentrate on the incentives of
firms to innovate if they expend resources simultaneously in a number of
parallel patent contests. We then compare this outcome with different patent
trading regimes and note that different trading regimes induce rather similar
incentives in patent contests. A generalization of this analysis looks at a
situation that also extends some of the analysis on cumulative, sequential
innovation. Here we consider the case in which patenting occurs in two
consecutive periods. We allow for k patents to be awarded in the first period
and n patents in the second period. It turns out that some, but not all of
the specific properties of the simultaneous multi-patent contest carry over to
this partially sequential problem.
2 The analytical problem
Consider two firms A and B that compete with each other in the following
three stage game.
In stage 1 the two firms spend efforts on R&D. They already hold k =
kA + kB patents, of which firm A holds kA ≥ 0 and firm B holds kB ≥ 0.
They need to innovate and patent n further essential components of a new
good. In this stage each firm chooses one level of R&D expenditure for each
component. These effort choices are made simultaneously and can be seen
as n independent, parallel patent contests. To save on notation, we define
x ≡ (x1, ...xn) and y ≡ (y1, ...yn).
A firm’s effort in an R&D contest typically has two effects that relate
to two different sources of uncertainty, as described by Loury (1979). First,
R&D is genuinely a risky activity, as it is uncertain whether and when own
research effort will yield the desired information. This type of uncertainty
may be called ’technological uncertainty’. Second, as other firms search for
the same information, there is some uncertainty about who innovates first,
and, hence, receives the patent. In line with Loury (1979) we call this the
’market uncertainty’. Both types of uncertainty are important.
We concentrate on market uncertainty. i.e., the information how to pro-
duce component i is eventually revealed, for any levels of effort. However,
the probability that firm A gets hold of the relevant information about com-
ponent i prior to firm B and wins the patent, is a function of the efforts in
3
the respective single patent contest as follows:
pi =
xi
xi + yi
if max{xi, yi} > 0, and pi = 1/2 otherwise. (1)
This description of a firm’s market uncertainty in the R&D contest between
two firms can be justified using an important equivalence result that has
been developed by Baye and Hoppe (2003). They show that many types of
innovation contest and patent race in which the process of innovation fol-
lows a stochastic process can be represented equivalently as a simple lottery
contest in which the contestants’ win probabilities equal their shares in ag-
gregate expenditure, and in which the value of winning the lottery prize is
a function of the aggregate contest efforts that depends more specifically on
the properties of the stochastic process. For some stochastic processes the
lottery prize is a constant with respect to aggregate efforts. We concentrate
on this case which corresponds to considering only market uncertainty.1
Once the efforts are chosen, the random process that is governed by win
probabilities (1) allocates the patents on the components i = 1, ...n to the
two firms. We assume that the random processes that determine the win
probabilities in the different components are stochastically independent of
each other.
At the beginning of stage 2 all components are innovated and patented.
We define the vector z = (z1, ..., zk, zk+1, ..., zk+n) with zi = a if firm A holds
patent i, and zi = b if firm B holds patent i. Firms negotiate with each
other about who is allowed to use which set of patents. We generally assume
that a firm needs to be in control of all patents, k + n to be able to produce
and market the good in question. To be in control means here that the firm
can use the respective technology covered by this patent without any risk of
being sued by the actual holder of the patent, either because the firm itself is
the holder of the patent, or because the outcome of trading and negotiating
between firms leads to this security. For the different types of negotiation
regimes, we draw on Shapiro (2001), and we explain these further below.
At the beginning of stage 3, these negotiations are completed. Patent
rights are finally allocated between firms. Any firm that is in control of all
k + n patents can produce and market the good, and any firm that is not
in control of all patents cannot enter the market. We do not model and
1For applicability of this function for the limit of a low discount rate see also Nti (1997).
The function also has been axiomatized for contests more generally by Skaperdas (1996).
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solve an explicit market game. Instead, we make the following assumptions
that are compatible with a large number of explicit market games, including
Cournot and Bertrand competition. If none of the firms is in control of all
rights, none of the firms can produce and both firms earn zero profits in
the product market. If only one firm is in control of all patents, this firm
is a monopolist and will earn the monopoly rent which is denoted as FM .
Consumer rent under monopoly will be denoted CM . By symmetry, these
values do not depend on which firm is the monopolist. If each firm is in
control of all patents, the firms will compete and each firm will earn the
equilibrium profit in duopoly, denoted by FD. Aggregate consumer rent in
the duopoly is denoted as CD. We will assume that the firm’s monopoly rent
exceeds the sum of the firms’ profits in a duopoly, and that consumer rents
in the monopoly are smaller than in the duopoly:
FM > 2FD, CM < CD, and
FM + CM < 2FD + CD.
(2)
Consider stage 2. Suppose the allocation of patent ownership is described
by some z at the beginning of stage 2. Shapiro (2001) discusses several
transaction modes by which firms may settle the conflict resulting from a set
of complementary patents that are allocated between several firms and yield
control of all patents to exactly one firm. For instance, firm A may acquire
firm B, including firm B’s intellectual property rights. Similarly, the two
firms may write a contract that allows A to use the technology components
that are protected by B’s patents, with B promising to not sue A for patent
right infringement, which will put A in the position of a monopoly. Third, the
two firms may form a patent pool and auction the exclusive right to produce
the good that needs all these technology components to a third firm, C which
then earns the monopoly rent.2
In the absence of informational asymmetries or contractual constraints
between firms, the two firms will end up with an allocation of their patents
that maximizes the sum of the joint profits they can obtain in the mar-
ket competition in stage 3, and this joint profit is the monopoly profit. If
z = (a, a, ...a) or if z = (b, b, ...b) , then it follows from subgame perfection
that any bargaining outcome will yield the monopoly profit to the firm that
2Implicitly we rule out that consumers take part in bargaining. While this is plausible,
given their much higher transaction cost, it is not crucial for the qualitative findings we
have on the R&D contest.
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owns all patents at the beginning of stage 2. If each firm holds at least one
patent, what needs to be determined is the function by which the monopoly
rent is shared between the two firms if both firms own at least one patent.
Many bargaining concepts that could be used to determine this distribution
will yield the same outcome, given the assumption about risk neutrality of
firms and symmetry. For simplicity, we assume symmetric Nash bargaining
among risk-neutral firms. Let firms have zero profits as their outside op-
tions. Then the surplus from efficient negotiations is the monopoly profit
FM and they share this evenly in the Nash bargaining solution. Hence, if
z /∈ {(a, a, ..., a), (b, b, ..., b)}, then the firms’ payoffs are
πA =
FM
2
− Σixi and πB =
FM
2
− Σiyi. (3)
We now turn to the multi-patent R&D contest in stage 1. We can state
the properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium for three different cases,
depending on whether some firm has acquired some complementary patents
in a previous stage.
Proposition 1 If k = 0, and n ∈ {1, 2, ..., 6}, a subgame perfect equilibrium
of the multi-patent contest with unconstrained bargaining between two firms
exists and is described by monopoly in the product market, efficient bargaining
that allocates patent rights such that only one firm can produce, and an in-
terior symmetric equilibrium in the simultaneous contests for n patents with
efforts
x∗i = y
∗
i =
FM
2n+1
for all i = 1, ...n. (4)
and equilibrium payoffs
π∗A = π
∗
B =
FM
2
− n FM
2n+1
> 0. (5)
Proof. We only consider stage 1 and use the properties of the equilib-
rium in the continuation game at stage 2 that have been discussed already.
When n = 1, this is a standard Tullock (1980) contest, and each contestant
will dissipate 1
4
of the monopoly rent FM , and this equilibrium is unique
(Szidarovszky and Okuguchi 1997).
Consider A’s objective function for n > 1. With an efficient bargaining
arrangement after the patent contest, the expected profit of firm A is a
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function of the two firms’ contest efforts. Using (3), the payoff is given by:
πA =
FM
2
+
Qi=n
i=1 xiQi=n
i=1(xi + yi)
FM
2
−
Qi=n
i=1 yiQi=n
i=1(xi + yi)
FM
2
− Σixi. (6)
Firm A receives the monopoly rent if it wins all patents, which explains the
additional payoff described by the second term in (6), and firm A does not
receive any rent if firm B wins all patents, which explains the third, negative
term on the right hand side. Finally, the firm has to pay the sum of its
efforts in the n parallel single patent contests, and this constitutes the fourth
term on the right-hand side. Equation (6) uses that the payoff is the same
for all outcomes in which both firms win at least one patent, no matter how
asymmetric is the distribution of patents in this case.3
For y = (y, y, ..., y), we use Lemma 1 in the Appendix that shows a
property of optimal replies x(y) and y(x): if B chooses y = (y1, y2, ..., yn)
with y1 = y2 = ... = yn ≡ y, then the optimal reply by firm A is some x(y)
with x1(y) = x2(y) = ... = xn(y) ≡ x(y), and, analogously for B’s optimal
reply y(x). In words, if one firm spends the same effort along all patent
contests, then the other firm’s optimal reply is characterized by uniform effort
along all patent contests. Using this result in (6) the first-order condition for
a uniform reply to the uniform vector y is the vector x(y) = (x, x, ...x) that
maximizes
πA(x) =
FM
2
+
xn − yn
(x+ y)n
FM
2
− nx. (7)
Note that
dπA(x)
dx
= n
xn−1y + yn
(x+ y)n+1
FM
2
− n. (8)
This term is zero for y = FM/2n+1 at x = FM/2n+1. Hence, for the candidate
equilibrium efforts the first-order conditions for an optimal reply by firms A
and B are fulfilled. Note also that this is the only symmetric solution of
dπA(x)
dx
= 0. For x∗ and y∗ as in (4) the two firms’ payoffs are strictly positive.
This also shows that x∗ is superior to a choice of x = 0. Moreover, the
strictly positive payoff for x∗ implies that x < FM/n must hold in the global
3An interesting generalization of our approach addresses a situation in which the
patents are not essential, in which case production cost may simply be a function of
the number of patents which a firm is allowed to use. However, the linearly-limitational
case we consider yields stark results and is of particular interest.
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maximum, as πA(x) ≤ 0 for x ≥ FM/n. In the Appendix, we show that x∗
also characterizes a global maximum on the interval x ∈ (0, FM/n).
The case in Proposition 1 describes a symmetric contest, in which two
prizes are at stake. By winning up to n− 1 patents, a firm gains veto-power.
If both firms are veto-players, they share the prize. If only one firm has
all patents, and, hence is the only veto-player, the firm receives the whole
prize FM . The results for this case are intuitive: as any patent is like any
other, each one being similarly contested for, and both firms expend the same
effort on the contest for each patent. The two firms’ total effort in all patent
contests sums up to
nx∗ + ny∗ =
nFM
2n
. (9)
This sum has its maximum for n = 1 and is strictly decreasing in n. Intu-
itively, if many complementary patents are needed to produce a particular
good, even if one firm, say A, expends much effort on each of the single patent
contests, it becomes very likely that both firms fail to obtain all patents. In
each of these cases firm A receives FM/2, independently of whether it holds
1, 2, or even n − 1 patents. This makes it less worthwhile to expend much
effort in the simultaneous contests.
Note that, for n ≥ 7, the problem is not ’well-behaved’, and (4) does
not characterize a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. This is also
illustrated numerically in Figure 2 in the Appendix. It shows that (4) does
not represent mutually optimal replies, as, for instance, A can do better than
choosing (4) if B chooses (4). We now turn to the situation in which one
of the firms holds some patents already at the stage where the two firms
enter into the simultaneous contests for n remaining patents. Without loss
of generality, we assume that this firm is firm A, and the next proposition
characterizes an equilibrium for all possible n.
Proposition 2 Suppose kA > 0 and kB = 0.
If n ∈ {1, 2} then there is a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium in which
x∗i = y
∗
i =
FM
2n+2
. (10)
If n > 2, then a mixed strategy equilibrium exists and is characterized by firm
B choosing
y∗i = (
n− 1
n
)n
FM
2n
1
n− 1
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and firm A choosing x∗ = [y
∗
i
p∗ , ...,
y∗i
p∗ ] with probability p
∗ = 1/(n − 1) and
x∗ = 0 with probability (1−p∗). Firm A’s expected payoff is π∗A = FM/2 and
firm B’s expected payoff is πB = FM2 (1−
2(n−1)n−1
nn ) in this equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that firm A holds a positive number of patents. We call
A the leader and B the follower in this case. Consider the contest over the
remaining n patents. When the ex post allocation of patents is resolved using
efficient bargaining (or licensing with exclusive exploitation of intellectual
property), the expected payoffs to the firms are:
πA =
FM
2
+
nY
i=1
xi
xi + yi
FM
2
− Σixi and (11)
πB = (1−
nY
i=1
xi
xi + yi
)
FM
2
− Σiyi. (12)
Since B cannot become the sole owner of all k + n patents, the only way
to share in the surplus is if firm B wins at least one of the n patents. A
straightforward solution of the system of equations that consist of the first-
order conditions for A maximizing (11) and B maximizing (12) yields
x∗i = y
∗
i =
FM
2n+2
(13)
and total expenditure per firm
nx∗i =
nFM
2n+2
. (14)
This interior solution yields π∗A > FM/2 and π
∗
B > 0 if n = 1 and π
∗
A = FM/2
and π∗B > 0 if n = 2. Hence, x
∗
i as in (13) also dominates xi = 0 for n = 1
and weakly dominates xi = 0 for n = 2.
If n > 2, then xi = yi = FM2n+2 yields πA ≤ FM/2, and, as x =(0, 0, ..., 0)
always yields at least πA ≥ FM/2, (13) is no longer an equilibrium. Consider
the candidate equilibrium in Proposition 2. For this to be an equilibrium,
y∗ = (y∗, ..., y∗) must maximize
πB =
"
(1−
nY
i=1
x∗
x∗ + yi
)
FM
2
−
nX
i=1
yi
#
p∗ + (1− p∗)
"
FM
2
−
nX
i=1
yi
#
, (15)
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Further, x∗ = (x∗, ..., x∗) must maximize
πA =
FM
2
+
nY
i=1
xi
xi + y∗
FM
2
− Σixi (16)
for all x with xi > 0. Further, for A to be indifferent between x∗ and x = 0,
πA(x = 0) = πA(x = x
∗)
must hold. For a solution the following three conditions must hold simulta-
neously: the first-order condition for xj:
y∗
(x∗ + y∗)2
(
x∗
x∗ + y∗
)n−1
FM
2
= 1, (17)
the first-order condition for yj:
p∗
x∗
(x∗ + y∗)2
(
x∗
x∗ + y∗
)n−1
FM
2
= 1 (18)
and the condition that makes firm A indifferent between x = 0 and x = x∗:
(
x∗
x∗ + y∗
)n
FM
2
− nx∗ = 0. (19)
Note that we have again made use of Lemma 1 in the Appendix: for a given
candidate equilibrium effort vector y∗ with uniform components, the optimal
reply x∗ must also have x∗1 = x
∗
2 = ... = x
∗
n ≡ x∗.
The indifference condition (19) can be transformed into ( x
∗
x∗+y∗ )
n−1 FM
2
=
n(x∗+y∗), and this can be substituted in (17) and (18) to obtain y
∗
x∗+y∗n = 1
and x
∗
x∗+y∗np
∗ = 1. This yields
y∗ = x∗p∗. (20)
We now use (20) in the indifference condition (19) and obtain
x∗ = (
1
1 + p∗
)n
FM
2n
and y∗ = p∗(
1
1 + p∗
)n
FM
2n
. (21)
Inserting (21) into (17) and simplifying leads to
p∗ =
1
n− 1 . (22)
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Hence, 1 + p∗ = n
n−1 . Accordingly,
x∗ = (
1
1 + p∗
)n
FM
2n
= (
n− 1
n
)n
FM
2n
(23)
and
y∗ = (
n− 1
n
)n
FM
2n
1
n− 1 . (24)
.
Given y∗ = (y∗, y∗, ...y∗), among all uniform vectors x, the vector x∗ is
optimal but yields just a payoff of πA = FM/2 for firm A. Accordingly, A is
indifferent between x = 0 and x = x∗. A may therefore randomize between
these two optimal choices and may choose x = x∗ with probability p∗ as
in (22). Moreover, given this choice by A, firm B maximizes the objective
function (15) with x∗ and p∗ given by (22) and (23).
The payoff of A in this equilibrium is obtained using one of the actions
from A’s equilibrium support, e.g., x = 0, together with y∗; hence, the payoff
is π∗A = FM/2. FirmB’s payoff is obtained by inserting the equilibrium values
in (15). Note that B’s expected payoff is below FM/2.
It remains to confirm that x = 0 and x = x∗ and y = y∗ indeed globally
maximize πA and πB, respectively. Using the homogeneity in FM we simplify
the notation and consider FM = 2. It remains to be shown that x∗ is a global
maximum of
πA(x) = 1 +
xn
(x+ y∗)n
− nx (25)
for x ∈ (0, 1
n
) for given y∗ = (n−1)
n−1
nn+1 and
πB = p
∗(1− (x
∗)n
(x∗ + y)n
)− ny (26)
takes a global maximum for y∗ for y ∈ (0, 1
p∗n) for given x
∗ = (n−1)
n
nn+1 and
p∗ = 1
n−1 .
Consider first (26). Taking the second derivative with respect to y yields
d2(πB)
(dy)2
= − x
np∗
(x+ y∗)n+2
(n+ 1)n < 0
for all x > 0.
11
Consider next (25). Taking the second derivative with respect to x yields
d2(πA)
(dx)2
= y∗ (ny∗ − 2x− y∗) x
n−2n
(x+ y∗)n+2
.
This second derivative is negative if and only if
x >
(n− 1)
2
y∗.
This shows that πA(x; y∗) starts out convex at the corner extremum for x = 0,
has a turning point at x0 = (n−1)
2
y∗, is concave on the whole range for x > x0,
and reaches its only further extremum at x∗ = 2x0 = (n − 1)y∗. Therefore,
the only possible candidates for a global maximum are x = 0 and x∗, but
πA(x = x
∗; y∗) = πA(x = 0; y
∗). This completes the proof.
Figure 1 illustrates the mixed strategy equilibrium for n > 2. It maps
πA(x) as a function of n and x.
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
z
2
4
6
n
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
x
Figure 1: The payoff πA as a function of x ∈ [0.001, 0.2] and n ∈ {1, 2, ..., 7}
for given y∗ for the case with kA > 0 and kB = 0.
Proposition 2 describes an asymmetric situation. One firm already holds
one or several patents when the two firms start fighting about the allocation
of the remaining patents. We call this firm the leading firm. The leading
firm has already secured half of the monopoly rent at the outset, and so the
contest over the remaining patents is about the other half of the monopoly
rent. The leading firm wins this second half only if it wins all remaining
patents, whereas the other firm needs to win only one of the patents to
12
secure this other half. The competition for this other half of the monopoly
rent is, therefore, asymmetric. The leading firm is at a disadvantage. The
disadvantage can be so large that the leading firm may actually give up and
not attempt to prevent the rival from also attaining a veto right. Indeed,
for large n, πB as in Proposition 2 converges towards FM/2, i.e., in the
equilibrium B receives half of the monopoly rent without expending any
significant effort.
The equilibrium in Proposition 2 is of some interest, particularly as the
leading firm does not really gain from actively participating in this contest.
Unless the leading firm wins in all n of the parallel contests that take place
in stage 1, it will lose the prize that is awarded in this stage to the other
firm. To win all these n patents is rather costly, and the cost increases in the
number of patents that have to be won in this stage. To match the effort that
is expended by the other firm along all dimensions becomes more and more
costly, because the probability that this effort succeeds along all contests is
drops rapidly as the number n of contests increases. The expected benefit of
the leading firm in the stage 1 contest is zero, and, to stay out of the contest
in this stage is an alternative, optimal option for the leading firm. Of course,
zero bids by the leading firm cannot constitute an equilibrium either, as the
other firm’s optimal reply to zero would be very low bids, so low that the
leading firm would like to make even higher positive bids, even if n is large.
The leading firm will therefore play a mixed strategy in the equilibrium. It
will bid zero in all patent contests in stage 1 with some positive probability,
and it will bid uniformly on all patents with an amount of effort that is just
optimal and also yields zero payoff with the remaining probability. Given
this bid strategy by the leading firm, the other firm is in a situation in which
any effort is valuable only in the states in which the leading firm chooses
the strictly positive effort. The larger the probability by which the leading
firm makes a zero bid, the smaller becomes the marginal increase in expected
payoff that the other firm can gain from an increase in its expenditure. As
this other firm’s payoff is concave in y, a larger p∗ reduces the optimal y of
firmB. Notice that when the leader makes a positive bid it is larger than that
of the rival, and that this difference increases the more patents that must be
won at stage 1; as n increases, the firm that holds no patents initially knows
that its chance of gaining a veto right are large by virtue of the fact that the
probability of the leader winning all of the patent contests is reduced for a
given expenditure.
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Proposition 3 If kA > 0 and kB > 0, then the equilibrium efforts in the
different patent contests are x∗i = y
∗
i = 0 and the equilibrium payoffs are
π∗A = π
∗
B = FM/2.
Proof. If kA > 0 and kB > 0, then, whatever is the allocation of the
remaining n patents, efficient negotiations will lead to monopoly profit which
is shared equally between the two firms. Accordingly, the optimal amounts
of effort are zero. This case highlights the importance of the assumption that
the contest effort is not valuable per se, but only reduces market uncertainty.
The case covered in Proposition 3 is straightforward. If both firms already
own some patents, they are already veto-players as regards the bargaining
and production stages, and the further allocation of the remaining n patents
is not payoff relevant for the subgames that may emerge in stages 2 and 3.
Therefore, the firms are unwilling to expend effort in stage 1 on acquiring
these patents.
3 Alternative patent trade regimes
We now discuss deviations from the benchmark case in the previous section
and consider regimes in which patent trade is restricted in different ways.
No patent trade Consider first the most severe patent trade restrictions
one could think of: suppose patents cannot be traded at all. The only case in
which production can take place in stage 3 is when one firm wins all patents.
Consider first the case k = 0. The payoff of firm A becomes
πA =
Qi=n
i=1 xiQi=n
i=1(xi + yi)
FM − Σixi, (27)
and equivalently for firm B. A firm wins only if it wins all patents, and if the
different single patent contests are mutually independent, this is the product
of the win probabilities for all patents i = 1, ...n.
Maximization of this payoff with respect to xj yields n identical first-order
conditions of the type
∂πA
∂xj
=
Q
i6=j xi
Qi=n
i=1(xi + yi)−
Q
i6=j(xi + yi)
Qi=n
i=1 xi³Qi=n
i=1(xi + yi)
´2 FM − 1 = 0 (28)
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Making use of the symmetry assumption, one obtains
y∗j = x
∗
j =
FM
2n+1
. (29)
Efforts and aggregate effort in this equilibrium is exactly the same as in the
equilibrium in Proposition 1 without any restrictions on patent trade:
Proposition 4 If all patent contests take place simultaneously, prohibition
of trade of exclusive patent rights between the firms does not change the con-
test effort in a symmetric interior equilibrium of the multi-patent contest.
Despite this similarity with respect to the contest stage, the equilibrium
payoffs differ from those in the benchmark case. Aggregate profit in the
interior equilibrium with efforts as in (29):
πA = πB =
FM
2n
− nFM
2n+1
=
FM(2− n)
2n+1
. (30)
For n = 2, this payoff is smaller than if patent trade is unconstrained. Firms
expend the same amount of R&D, but each firm wins the monopoly rent only
with probability 1/4, if patents cannot be traded. Firms and consumers are
worse off ex-ante for n = 2, if patents cannot be traded. For n > 2, the profit
(30) becomes negative, and symmetric effort as in (29) does not constitute
an equilibrium in this case.
For k > 0, if kA > 0 and kB > 0, then, under this regime, no profits ac-
crue, because no production will take place, and no contest effort is expended
in this case. Accordingly, the contest effort in this case is also the same as in
the case with unrestricted bargaining as in Proposition 3, but for somewhat
different reasons.
For kA > 0 and kB = 0, it does not make sense for firm B to expend
positive effort. Even if firm B wins all n patents that are awarded in the
stage 1, under the no-trade regime the industry profit that accrues in stage 3
will still be zero. Accordingly, the effort choices differ in the no-trade regime
from the effort choices in Proposition 2.
Selective patent licensing agreements Suppose now that firms can
agree on sharing patents but cannot establish exclusive user rights on patents
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that have been traded, or restrict each firm’s use of the patent in other ways.4
Institutionally, this type of property rights regime may be the outcome of
cross-licensing of two firms, and may be the outcome if the trade regimes
that yield a monopoly in stage 3, such as a merger of the two firms, are not
feasible, for instance due to competition policy.
Perhaps surprisingly, this regime leads to equilibrium R&D efforts and
payoffs that are the same as in the unconstrained benchmark regime. If one
firm wins all k + n patents, this firm will become a monopolist, like in the
framework with free trade. If, instead, each firm wins at least 1 patent,
efficient negotiations will take place as follows. For each single patent, firms
can negotiate the right to jointly use a patent for each single patent. An
agreement that maximizes their joint surplus that is compatible with the
restriction on patent sharing is as follows. Suppose firm A wins patents
1...m and firm B wins patents m + 1, ...(n + k). In this case one and only
one of the firms may offer the other firm the right to join in the use of all
its patents. For instance, A may sell the right to make use of the technology
components 1, ...m, and ask for a fee equal to FM
2
in this case, whereas firmB
sticks to its exclusive rights to use patentsm+1, ...(n+k). As a result, B will
be the only firm that is able to produce the good, and will earn the monopoly
profit. This outcome is an equilibrium of any subgame in which both firms
hold at least one patent. It maximizes the total payoff of the two firms, as
it leads to the monopoly profit, and, as in the benchmark case, it shares this
profit between the two firms. Accordingly, the objective functions of firms
at the contest stage are the same as in the benchmark case. We summarize
this as
Proposition 5 Trade restrictions that allow only for selective patent licens-
ing agreements between the firms do not change the contest effort in a sym-
metric interior equilibrium of the multi-patent contest.
Joint use of patent pools Consider a different regime that is more restric-
tive with respect to which contractual arrangements are feasible. We again
rule out contracts that transfer exclusive user rights for a patent from one
4One such restriction could be a limit on the number of units of the good which the
licensee is allowed to produce using a particular technology component. Such licensing
arrangements are not uncommon and are seemingly anti-competitive. Note, however, that
such arrangements are not needed here to obtain the monopoly outcome in the equilibrium.
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firm to the other. We also rule out patent specific contracts as regards mak-
ing use of a particular patent. Instead, firms may either keep the patents they
have and use them exclusively, or they may pool all information and patent
rights they have, like in a grand patent pool, and use them non-exclusively
among them.
If one firm exclusively owns the patent rights for all n + k components,
sequential rationality in stages 2 and 3 will imply that the firms do not form
a patent pool, but the firm that owns all patents will produce as a monopolist
in stage 3 and earn the monopoly profit FM .
If each firm owns at least one patent, if they do not form a patent pool
each firm will earn zero profits in the market game. If, instead, the firms form
a patent pool, both firms can produce in the market game. The outcome in
the market game is described by competition between duopolists. Each firm
earns FD.
Turning to stage 1, let us assume that k = 0. Of course, n > 1, as
otherwise there is nothing to pool. For reasons of symmetry, we can consider
the payoff for one firm. Firm A’s objective function is
πA = FD +
Qi=n
i=1 xiQi=n
i=1(xi + yi)
(FM − FD)−
Qi=n
i=1 yiQi=n
i=1(xi + yi)
FD − Σixi. (31)
Firm A receives the duopoly profit in all patent allocations that emerge from
the contest stage, except if firm A wins all patents or if firm A wins none
of the patents. The first exception yields an additional payoff for firm A
equal to (FM − FD) and the exception occurs with the probability that is
described by the ratio term in the second term on the right hand side of
(31). The second exception yields firm A a payoff of zero, as the other firm
has all patents. This is described by the third term in (31). Finally, and as
in previous cases, the firm has to pay for the efforts in the n parallel R&D
contests, and this constitutes the fourth term on the right-hand side.
Maximization of this payoff with respect to xj for j = 1, ...n yields n
identical first-order conditions
T
i6=j xi
Ti=n
i=1 (xi+yi)−
T
i6=j(xi+yi)
Ti=n
i=1 xi
(
Ti=n
i=1 (xi+yi))
2 (FM − FD)
+
T
i 6=j(xi+yi)
Ti=n
i=1 yi
(
Ti=n
i=1 (xi+yi))
2 FD − 1 = 0
Using symmetry, this reduces to
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x∗j = y
∗
j =
FM
2n+1
. (32)
Again, the effort choice in a symmetric interior equilibrium is the same as
in the regime in which exclusive patent rights can be traded freely, whereas
the equilibrium payoffs differ. The payoff is equal to FD + 12n (FM − FD) −
1
2nFD −
nFM
2n+1 which is equal to
πA = πB =
2FD(2
n−1 − 1)
2n
+
FM(2− n)
2n+1
.
This payoff is non-negative for n = 2. Whether it is positive or negative for
larger values of n depends upon the relative size of FD and FM . For n > 2 it
is positive for
FD
FM
>
n− 2
2n+1 − 4 . (33)
The ratio on the right hand side peaks at n = 3 (it is about 0.0833), and
decreases (rapidly) in n thereafter, and whether this condition is fulfilled
depends on the type of competition in a duopoly. Consumers gain from
this regime compared to unconstrained trade of exclusive patent rights if the
symmetric interior equilibrium exists, as the product is always supplied by
at least one firm in both regimes, but the market is monopolized if exclusive
patent rights can be traded without any restrictions, and a jointly used patent
pool leads to a duopoly with a considerable probability which becomes ever
larger if the number of patents is higher. This is summarized as a proposition:
Proposition 6 Let k = 0 and n > 1. If firms cannot trade single patent
rights, but can form a grand patent pool, condition (33) characterizes a nec-
essary condition for the symmetric interior R&D contest equilibrium to exist.
In this equilibrium they spend the same contest effort as with free patent trade.
Firm payoffs are lower and consumer rents are higher than in the case with
free patent trade.
To get an intuition whether condition (33) is likely to hold, we consider
Bertrand and Cournot competition with perfect substitutes. With Bertrand
competition between identical firms, FD = 0, and the condition fails, i.e., no
interior symmetric equilibrium at the contest stage for n > 2 exists. With
Cournot competition with homogenous products, constant marginal cost and
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linear demand, FD/FM = 4/9, and participants make positive payoffs for all
n.
We now turn to cases in which firms may have acquired some patents in
stages prior to stage 1.
Proposition 7 Suppose kA > 0 and kB = 0. If FMFD ≥ n ≥ 1 then there is a
pure strategy equilibrium in which
x∗i = (
FM − FD
FM
)n
FD(FM − FD)
FM
(34)
y∗i = (
FM − FD
FM
)n
FDFD
FM
(35)
The corresponding expected payoffs are:
πA = FD + (
FM − FD
FM
)n(FM − FD)(
FM − nFD
FM
)
πB = FD − (
FM − FD
FM
)nFD(
FM + nFD
FM
).
For n > FM
FD
a mixed strategy equilibrium exists that is characterized by firm
B choosing
y∗i = (
n− 1
n
)n
(FM − FD)
n(n− 1) , i = 1, ..., n
and firm A choosing x∗ = [y
∗
i (FM−FD)
p∗FD
, .....,
y∗i (FM−FD)
p∗FD
] with probability p∗ =
FM−FD
FD(n−1) and x
∗ = 0 with probability (1 − p∗). Firm A’s expected payoff is
π∗A = FD and firm B’s expected payoff is πB = FD −
2(FM−FD)
n−1 (
n−1
n
)n in this
equilibrium.
Proof. Analogously to the proof of Proposition 2, the expected payoffs
to the firms are:
πA = FD +
nY
i=1
xi
xi + yi
(FM − FD)− Σixi and (36)
πB = (1−
nY
i=1
xi
xi + yi
)FD − Σiyi. (37)
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A straightforward solution of the system of equations that consist of the first-
order conditions for A maximizing (36) and B maximizing (37) yields the
result in (34). Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify πA ≥ FD, πB ≥ 0
for FM
FD
≥ n ≥ 1.
If n > FM
FD
, then the pure strategy equilibrium breaks down since the
interior solution is dominated by zero. There is a mixed strategy equilibrium,
however. Consider the candidate equilibrium in Proposition 7. For this to
be an equilibrium, y∗ = (y∗, ..., y∗) must maximize
πB =
"
(1−
nY
i=1
x∗
x∗ + yi
)FD −
nX
i=1
yi
#
p∗ + (1− p∗)
"
FD −
nX
i=1
yi
#
, (38)
Further, x∗ = (x∗, ..., x∗) must maximize
πA = FD +
nY
i=1
xi
xi + y∗
(FM − FD)− Σixi (39)
for all x with xi > 0. Further, for A to be indifferent between x∗ and x = 0,
πA(x = 0) = πA(x = x
∗)
must hold. Proceeding as in the proof to Proposition 2 yields the stated
values for x∗, y∗, and p∗. Substitution yields the expected payoffs. For p∗
to be bounded below 1 requires nFD > FM . This condition guarantees that
πB ≥ 0 in equilibrium.
Qualitatively, there is a similarity between the equilibrium in Proposition
7 and that in Proposition 2. For sufficiently low n there is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium, but as the number of patents grows a mixed strategy equi-
librium will emerge. The intuition behind this is analogous to Proposition 2.
The larger is the relative gain to monopoly power (FM−FD
FD
), the higher is the
effort by the leading firm for the remaining n patents, and the larger is the
probability that this positive effort is made.
The case kA > 0 and kB > 0 is more straightforward and the result is
the same as in Proposition 3. As both firms already hold at least one of
the complementary patents, any allocation of the n remaining patents in
stage 1 will not change the industry profits and their division in the stages 2
and 3; each firm will receive the duopoly profit, independent of their contest
efforts in stage 1. Hence, their equilibrium efforts will be zero, just like in
Proposition 3.
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4 Conclusions
The number of patents that are used for single products is considerable, for
many standard products. In this paper we have considered R&D contests if
firms may, but need not have acquired some patents, but need n additional
complementary patent rights for components from which they can produce a
consumer good. We show that this complementarity generally weakens the
incentives to invest in R&D effort. If firms can freely trade the rights to use
each single of these n patents, the sum of all R&D effort in all single patent
contests is decreasing in the number of complementary patents. Intuitively,
if many complementary patents are needed to produce a particular good,
even if one firm spends much effort on each of the single patent contests, it
becomes very likely each firm fails to obtain all patents. But if each of the
firms obtains at least one patent, this patent yields veto power, and a firm’s
payoff is therefore the same whether it holds 1, 2, or even n−1 patents. This
makes it less worthwhile to spend much effort in the n simultaneous contests.
Considering the R&D competition for fully complementary patents be-
tween firms who already hold one or several such patents and firms who
do not, we find that holding such patents yields some secure payoff to such
leading firms. However, it also yields a disadvantage for the leading firms
in the ongoing patent contest for further patents. With a large number of
further patents, the leading firms cannot gain from participating in these
further contests. However, the mixed strategy equilibrium requires that they
participate with a certain equilibrium probability nevertheless.
We also show that this result is robust with respect to alternative trading
regimes among patent holders. Particularly, if patent rights cannot be traded
at all, or if exclusive rights in patents cannot be traded, but patents can only
be licensed, or if firms can only enter into a general patent sharing arrange-
ment (a ’patent pool’) and use all their patents jointly and non-exclusively,
the marginal incentives to spend effort in the simultaneous single patent
contests remain unchanged. The profits for firms are lower in some of these
regimes, however, and these marginal incentives need not characterize an
interior equilibrium if the number n of components becomes large.
From the buyers’ point of view, among the regimes we study, the patent
pool yields the highest consumer rents, provided that n is small enough
such that the interior symmetric contest equilibrium is sustained under this
regime.
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5 Appendix
Optimality of uniform effort In this appendix we first prove the follow-
ing lemma:
Lemma 1 Let
π(r) =
nY
i=1
ri
ri + s
− Σiri (40)
or
π(r) = 1−
nY
i=1
s
s+ ri
− Σiri (41)
for some given s > 0. Then for any Σiri > 0 with ri ≥ 0 the vector
r = (r1, r2, ..., rn) that maximizes (40) has r1 = r2 = ... = rn.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Consider (40). Let r = (r1, r2, r3,
r4, ..., rn) be a vector that maximizes (40). Denote Σi=ni=1ri ≡ ρ. We first note
that any vector r that maximizes (40) is either r = 0, or has components that
are all strictly positive, as r is otherwise strictly dominated by (0, 0, ..., 0).
If r = 0, then the claim in the lemma is true, as all components ri are
identically zero.
Consider now the case rj 6= 0. The payoff π in (40) can be written as
π(r) =
r1
r1 + s
r2
r2 + s
nY
i=3
ri
ri + s
− Σiri ≡
r1
r1 + s
r2
r2 + s
Ψ− ρ.
Assume that r1 < r2. Then a marginal increase in r1 by dr1 > 0 and a
simultaneous change in r2 by dr2 such that dr1 + dr2 = 0 changes profit by
dπ
dr1
=
∙
s
(r1 + s)2
r2
r2 + s
− r1
r1 + s
s
(r2 + s)2
¸
Ψ
=
∙
r2
r1 + s
− r1
r2 + s
¸ ∙
s
(r1 + s)(r2 + s)
¸
Ψ > 0.
The strict inequality holds because the last two terms on the left-hand side are
always strictly positive, whereas
h
r2
r1+s
− r1
r2+s
i
> 0 if r2 > r1. But this shows
that r with r1 6= r2 is not optimal and this constitutes the contradiction.
The proof for (41) follows analogous lines.
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Global optimality of x∗ in Proposition 1 In this section of the Appen-
dix, we show that x∗ is a global maximum for n ≤ 6. For this purpose, we
first consider the range n ≤ 4 analytically, and turn to the range n ∈ {5, 6}
numerically.
Lemma 2 The function (7) is concave in x in the relevant range x ∈
[0, FM/n] for n ≤ 4.
Proof. Note first that the second derivative of πA in (7) with respect to
x is
d2πA
(dx)2
=
nFM
2
(xn−2 − yn−2)y2(n− 1)− 2xn−1y − 2yn
(x+ y)n+2
. (42)
This expression (42) is negative for all x ≤ y+ δ for some strictly positive δ.
Accordingly, πA(x) is strictly concave in the whole range x ∈ (0, y + δ).
Consider now concavity for the remaining range x ∈ ( FM
2n+1 ,
FM
n
). Note
that the optimization problem is homogenous in the size of FM and simplify
notation by assuming that FM = 2, such that this interval can be denoted
x ∈ (1/2n, 2/n). The right hand side of (42) is negative if (xn−2−yn−2)y2(n−
1)− 2xn−1y − 2yn < 0, or after inserting y = 1/2n, if
(xn−2 − 1
2n(n−2)
)
1
22n
(n− 1)− 2xn−1 1
2n
− 2 1
2nn
< 0.
Multiplying with 2n and regrouping yields
(xn−2 − 1
2n(n−2)
)
1
2n
(n− 1)− 2xn−1 − 2 1
2n(n−1)
< 0. (43)
One sufficient condition for this term to be negative is therefore xn−2 1
2n (n−
1)− 2xn−1 < 0, or equivalently
n− 1
2n+1
< x.
It remains to be shown that (43) holds also for the range x ∈ [1/2n, (n −
1)/2n+1]. Consider again the general condition (43). Divide by xn−2 and
transform to 1
2n (n− 1)− 2x <
1
2n (n− 1)
1
2n(n−2)
1
xn−2 +2
1
2n(n−1)
1
xn−2 , or equiva-
lently
1
2n
(n− 1)− 2x < (n+ 1) 1
2n(n−1)
1
xn−2
Multiply by 2n
(n− 1)− 2n+1x < (n+ 1)
(2nx)n−2
(44)
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Define now z ≡ 2nx, and rewrite (44) as (n− 1)− 2z < (n+1)
zn−2 or equivalently
zn−2(n− 1− 2z) < n+ 1. (45)
A sufficient condition for (45) to hold is that the bracketed expression on the
left is negative; this is least likely to be the case when z is small, i.e. x = 1
2n .
Inserting this into (n−1−2z) = n−3, so that the inequality holds for n = 2
and n = 3. For n > 3,
sign
∂(zn−2(n− 1− 2z))
∂z
= sign((n− 1)(n− 2− 2z)).
On z ∈ [1, (n−1)
2
], (n−2−2z) takes a maximum for z = 1, and this shows that
concavity can be obtained analytically for n ≤ 4. The payoff πA as in (7) is
concave for x ∈ (0, FM/n) for n ≤ 4 and this establishes that x∗ describes a
global maximum.
For larger n, the value x∗ as in Proposition 1 is a local extremum, but
the function (7) is not globally concave. However, we can establish that x∗
is an optimal reply to y∗ for n = 5 and n = 6, and its suboptimality of x∗
for n > 6 numerically, and also show that x∗ is not an optimal reply to y∗
for n ≥ 7.
Consider πA(x∗; y∗) − πA(x ; y∗) for FM = 2. Note that the interval of
values of x that could possibly yield higher payoff than x∗ is the interval
x ∈ [ 1
2n ,
n−1
2
1
2n ]. The payoff difference can be parametrized in this interval
by parameters n and a, such that
πA(x
∗; y∗)− πA(x ; y∗)
=
µ
1− n( 1
2n
)
¶
−
µ
1 +
((1− a) 1
2n + a
n−1
2n+1 )
n − ( 1
2n )
n
(((1− a) 1
2n + a
n−1
2n+1 ) + (
1
2n ))
n
− n(1− a
2n
+ a
n− 1
2n+1
)
¶
with a ∈ [0, 1], where a = 0 corresponds to x = 1/2n and a = 1 corresponds
to x = n−1
2
1
2n . Calculating this difference for a grid for the number of patents
that equals the natural numbers, and for a much finer grid for a yields the
following value profile, where only positive values of πA(x∗; y∗)−πA(x ; y∗) are
depicted, and the surface breaks off at the front part where it hits negative
values. This illustrates that x∗ is an optimal reply to y∗ only for n ≤ 6.
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Figure 2: The surface describes the positive values of πA(x∗; y∗)− πA(x ; y∗)
for a ∈ [0.05, 0.95] for values of n ∈ {2, ...10}. The south-east frontier of this
surface denotes combinations of a and n for which πA(x∗; y∗)− πA(x ; y∗)
becomes negative. Hence, for n > 6, x∗ is not an optimal reply to y∗.
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